4. ACM-EC 2003: San Diego, California, USA

@proceedings{DBLP:conf/sigecom/2003,
  title     = {Proceedings 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2003),
               San Diego, California, USA, June 9-12, 2003},
  booktitle = {ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce},
  publisher = {ACM},
  year      = {2003},
  isbn      = {1-58113-679-X},
  bibsource = {DBLP, http://dblp.uni-trier.de}
}

• Jon M. Kleinberg, Mark Sandler:
  Convergent algorithms for collaborative filtering. 1-10
  
• Chrysanthos Dellarocas:
  Efficiency through feedback-contingent fees and rewards in auction marketplaces with adverse selection and moral hazard. 11-18
  
• Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
  k-Implementation. 19-28
  
• Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline:
  Envy-free auctions for digital goods. 29-35
  
• Richard J. Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, Aranyak Mehta:
  Playing large games using simple strategies. 36-41
  
• Sham Kakade, Michael J. Kearns, John Langford, Luis E. Ortiz:
  Correlated equilibria in graphical games. 42-47
  
• Michael L. Littman, Peter Stone:
  A polynomial-time nash equilibrium algorithm for repeated games. 48-54
  
• Chris Preist, Claudio Bartolini, Andrew Byde:
  Agent-based service composition through simultaneous negotiation in forward and reverse auctions. 55-63
  
• Moshe Babaioff, William E. Walsh:
  Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation. 64-75
  
• Ryan Porter, Yoav Shoham:
  On cheating in sealed-bid auctions. 76-84
  
• Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Kenji Terada:
  A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids. 85-92
  
• Evangelos Markakis, Amin Saberi:
  On the core of the multicommodity flow game. 93-97
  
• Richard Cole, Yevgeniy Dodis, Tim Roughgarden:
  How much can taxes help selfish routing? 98-107
  
• Nikhil R. Devanur, Milena Mihail, Vijay V. Vazirani:
  Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games. 108-114
  
• Michael P. Wellman, Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, Daniel M. Reeves, Sowmya Swaminathan:
  Exploring bidding strategies for market-based scheduling. 115-124
  
• Eiichiro Kazumori:
  Selling online versus offline: theory and evidences from Sotheby's. 125-134
  
• Yuan-Chi Chang, Chung-Sheng Li, John R. Smith:
  Searching dynamically bundled goods with pairwise relations. 135-143
  
• Lance Fortnow, Joe Kilian, David M. Pennock, Michael P. Wellman:
  Betting boolean-style: a framework for trading in securities based on logical formulas. 144-155
  
• Joan Feigenbaum, Lance Fortnow, David M. Pennock, Rahul Sami:
  Computation in a distributed information market. 156-165
  
• Anshul Kothari, David C. Parkes, Subhash Suri:
  Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multi-unit auctions. 166-175
  
• Martin Zinkevich, Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm:
  On polynomial-time preference elicitation with value queries. 176-185
  

Poster paper sessions

• Eugene Fink, Josh Johnson, John Hershberger:
  Multi-attribute exchange market: representation and indexing of orders. 186-187
  
• Zhen Liu, Laura Wynter, Cathy H. Xia:
  Pricing and QoS of information services in a competitive market (extended abstract). 188-189
  
• Shuchi Chawla, D. Kitchin, Uday Rajan, R. Ravi, Amitabh Sinha:
  Profit guaranteeing mechanisms for multicast networks. 190-191
  
• Andrew Byde:
  Applying evolutionary game theory to auction mechanism design. 192-193
  
• Markus Bläser, Bodo Manthey:
  Budget balanced mechanisms for the multicast pricing problem with rates. 194-195
  
• Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm:
  Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. 196-197
  
• Andrew Byde, Michael Yearworth, Kay-Yut Chen, Claudio Bartolini, Nir Vulkan:
  AutONA: a system for automated multiple 1-1 negotiation. 198-199
  
• Floortje Alkemade, Johannes A. La Poutré, Hans Amman:
  Intermediaries in an electronic trade network. 200-201
  
• Nikhil R. Devanur, Vijay V. Vazirani:
  Extensions of the spending constraint-model: existence and uniqueness of equilibria (extended abstract). 202-203
  
• Li Li, Stephen F. Smith:
  An agent-based framework for dynamic multi-period continuous double auctions in B2B exchanges. 204-205
  
• Ning Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Hong Zhu:
  Combinatorial auction across independent markets (extended abstract). 206-207
  
• Cuihong Li, Gerald Tesauro:
  A strategic decision model for multi-attribute bilateral negotiation with alternating. 208-209
  
• Glen Nuckolls, Charles U. Martel, Stuart G. Stubblebine:
  Certifying data from multiple sources (extended abstract). 210-211
  
• Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm:
  Auction mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency. 212-213
  
• Aditya V. Sunderam, David C. Parkes:
  Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions. 214-215
  
• Michael P. Wellman, Daniel M. Reeves, Kevin M. Lochner:
  Price prediction in a trading agent competition (extended abstract). 216-217
  
• Aranyak Mehta, Scott Shenker, Vijay V. Vazirani:
  Profit-maximizing multicast pricing by approximating fixed points. 218-219
  
• Felix Brandt:
  Social choice and preference protection: towards fully private mechanism design. 220-221
  
• Te-Kai Liu, Amir Behroozi, Santhosh Kumaran:
  A performance model for a BPI middleware. 222-223
  
• James E. Hanson, Gerald Tesauro, Jeffrey O. Kephart, E. C. Snibl:
  Multi-agent implementation of asymmetric protocol for bilateral negotiations. 224-225
  
• Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm:
  Using value queries in combinatorial auctions. 226-227
  
• Li Xiong, Ling Liu:
  A reputation-based trust model for peer-to-peer ecommerce communities. 228-229
  
• Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
  Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core. 230-231
  
• Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
  Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer. 232-233
  
• Indu Bingham, Barbara Hoefle, Kim Phan, Jim Sizemore, Arthur M. Keller:
  Collaboration software to reduce inventory and increase response. 234-235
  
• Anshul Kothari, Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri:
  Solving combinatorial exchanges: optimality via a few partial bids. 236-237
  
• Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Margo I. Seltzer:
  Virtual worlds: fast and strategyproof auctions for dynamic resource allocation. 238-239
  
• Eric J. Friedman, David C. Parkes:
  Pricing WiFi at Starbucks: issues in online mechanism design. 240-241
  
• Peter R. Wurman, Gangshu Cai, Ashish Sureka:
  Computing the outcome of proxy bidding in combinatorial auctions extended abstract. 242-243
  
• Jiong Sun, Norman M. Sadeh:
  Dynamic supply chain formation: integrating multi-attribute auctions and finite capacity scheduling. 244-245
  
• Ko Fujimura, Takuo Nishihara:
  Reputation rating system based on past behavior of evaluators. 246-247
  
• Rahul Garg, Vijay Kumar, Atri Rudra, Akshat Verma:
  Coalitional games on graphs: core structure, substitutes and frugality. 248-249
  
• Henry Lieberman, Earl Wagner:
  End-user tools for debugging e-commerce. 250-251
  
• Christopher H. Brooks, Robert S. Gazzale, Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, Edmund H. Durfee:
  Improving learning performance by applying economic knowledge. 252-253
  
• Martin Bichler, Jayant Kalagnanam:
  A nonoparametric estimator for setting: reserve prices in procurement auctions. 254-255
  
• Soumyadip Ghosh, Jayant Kalagnanam:
  Polyhedral sampling for multiattribute preference elicitation. 256-257
  
• Sandip Debnath, David M. Pennock, C. Lee Giles, Steve Lawrence:
  Information incorporation in online in-Game sports betting markets. 258-259
  
• Thomas Kwok, Thao Nguyen, Linh Lam:
  Tracking results from multichannel marketing programs on electronic commerce. 260-261
  
• Song Han, Winson K. Y. Yeung, Jie Wang:
  Identity-based confirmer signatures from pairings over elliptic curves. 262-263
  
• Daniel Dajun Zeng, Fei-Yue Wang, Sudha Ram:
  Storage allocation in web prefetching techniques. 264-265
  
• Chito Jovellanos:
  Semantic and syntactic interoperability: in transactional systems. 266-267
  
• Norman M. Sadeh, Ting-Chak Chan, Linh Van, Oh Byung Kwon, Kazuaki Takizawa:
  A semantic web environment for context-aware m-commerce. 268-269
  
• Amitava Dutta, Rahul Roy:
  Effects of information feedback loops on supply chain performance. 270-271
  
• Charles Polk, Robin Hanson, John O. Ledyard, Takashi Ishikida:
  The policy analysis market: an electronic commerce application of a combinatorial information market. 272-273
  
• John V. Harrison, Anna Andrusiewicz:
  The digital signage exchange: a virtual marketplace for out-of-home digital advertising. 274
  
• John O. Ledyard, John C. Lin:
  Baby bond connect: software for combined value trading. 275
  
• Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes:
  Using redundancy to improve robustness of distributed mechanism implementations. 276-277
  
• Boi Faltings:
  Incentive compatible open constraint optimization. 278-279
  
• Joan Feigenbaum, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Rahul Sami, Scott Shenker:
  Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing. 280