4. WINE 2008: Shanghai, China

Invited Talks 1: Special Session

• Eric Maskin:
  Mechanism Design Theory: How to Implement Social Goals. 1
  
• Lawrence J. Lau:
  Thirty Years of Chinese Economic Reform: Reasons for Its Success and Future Directions. 2-3
  

Invited Talks 2: Plenary Session

• Matthew O. Jackson:
  Average Distance, Diameter, and Clustering in Social Networks with Homophily. 4-11
  
• Paul Milgrom:
  Assignment Exchanges. 12
  
• Hal R. Varian:
  Search Engine Ad Auctions. 13
  
• Yinyu Ye:
  Computational Economy Equilibrium and Application. 14
  

Invited Talks 3: Tutorial Session

• Fan Chung Graham:
  Four Graph Partitioning Algorithms. 15
  
• Zhi-Quan Luo:
  Dynamic Spectrum Management: Optimization and Game Theoretic Formulations. 16
  
• Christos H. Papadimitriou:
  Some Recent Results in Algorithmic Game Theory. 17
  
• Herbert E. Scarf:
  The Elements of General Equilibrium Theory. 18
  

Market Equilibrium

• Lisa Fleischer, Rahul Garg, Sanjiv Kapoor, Rohit Khandekar, Amin Saberi:
  A Fast and Simple Algorithm for Computing Market Equilibria. 19-30
  
• Zhisu Zhu, Chuangyin Dang, Yinyu Ye:
  A FPTAS for Computing a Symmetric Leontief Competitive Economy Equilibrium. 31-40
  
• Kevin L. Chang, Aaron Johnson:
  Online and Offline Selling in Limit Order Markets. 41-52
  
• Bobji Mungamuru, Hector Garcia-Molina:
  Predictive Pricing and Revenue Sharing. 53-60
  
• Luyi Gui, Özlem Ergun:
  Dual Payoffs, Core and a Collaboration Mechanism Based on Capacity Exchange Prices in Multicommodity Flow Games. 61-69
  

Congestion Games

• Vittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli, Michele Flammini, Luca Moscardelli:
  Graphical Congestion Games. 70-81
  
• Elisabeth Gassner, Johannes Hatzl, Sven Oliver Krumke, Heike Sperber, Gerhard J. Woeginger:
  How Hard Is It to Find Extreme Nash Equilibria in Network Congestion Games? 82-93
  
• Dominic Dumrauf, Burkhard Monien:
  On the Road to -Completeness: 8 Agents in a Singleton Congestion Game. 94-108
  
• Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir:
  Conflicting Congestion Effects in Resource Allocation Games. 109-117
  
• Aaron Roth:
  The Price of Malice in Linear Congestion Games. 118-125
  

Information Markets

• Shipra Agrawal, Zizhuo Wang, Yinyu Ye:
  Parimutuel Betting on Permutations. 126-137
  
• Tian-Ming Bu, Xiaotie Deng, Qianya Lin, Qi Qi:
  Strategies in Dynamic Pari-Mutual Markets. 138-153
  
• Nicolas S. Lambert, Yoav Shoham:
  Truthful Surveys. 154-165
  
• John Wu:
  Correlated Equilibrium of Bertrand Competition. 166-177
  
• Marc Lelarge:
  Diffusion of Innovations on Random Networks: Understanding the Chasm. 178-185
  

Nash Equilibrium I

• Constantinos Daskalakis:
  An Efficient PTAS for Two-Strategy Anonymous Games. 186-197
  
• Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Markus Holzer:
  Equilibria of Graphical Games with Symmetries. 198-209
  
• Spyros C. Kontogiannis, Paul G. Spirakis:
  Equilibrium Points in Fear of Correlated Threats. 210-221
  
• Haralampos Tsaknakis, Paul G. Spirakis, Dimitrios Kanoulas:
  Performance Evaluation of a Descent Algorithm for Bi-matrix Games. 222-230
  
• Pinyan Lu, Changyuan Yu:
  Worst-Case Nash Equilibria in Restricted Routing. 231-238
  

Network Games I

• Vincenzo Bonifaci, Tobias Harks, Guido Schäfer:
  Stackelberg Routing in Arbitrary Networks. 239-250
  
• Davide Bilò, Luciano Gualà, Guido Proietti, Peter Widmayer:
  Computational Aspects of a 2-Player Stackelberg Shortest Paths Tree Game. 251-262
  
• Esteban Arcaute, Ramesh Johari, Shie Mannor:
  Local Two-Stage Myopic Dynamics for Network Formation Games. 263-277
  
• Vincenzo Auletta, Luca Moscardelli, Paolo Penna, Giuseppe Persiano:
  Interference Games in Wireless Networks. 278-285
  
• Martin Hoefer, Lars Olbrich, Alexander Skopalik:
  Taxing Subnetworks. 286-294
  

Solution Concepts

• Vincent Conitzer:
  Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules. 295-306
  
• Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind, Evangelos Markakis, Nicholas R. Jennings:
  Overlapping Coalition Formation. 307-321
  
• Edoardo Gallo:
  A Network-Based Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution. 322-333
  
• Fang Wu, Bernardo A. Huberman:
  How Public Opinion Forms. 334-341
  
• Shaili Jain, David C. Parkes:
  A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Games with a Purpose. 342-350
  

Algorithms and Optimization I

• Michael Schapira, Yaron Singer:
  Inapproximability of Combinatorial Public Projects. 351-361
  
• Alexander Grigoriev, Joyce van Loon, Marc Uetz:
  Algorithms for Optimal Price Regulations. 362-373
  
• Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos:
  Improving the Efficiency of Load Balancing Games through Taxes. 374-385
  
• Elliot Anshelevich, Gordon T. Wilfong:
  Network Formation and Routing by Strategic Agents Using Local Contracts. 386-393
  
• Ulrik Brandes, Martin Hoefer, Bobo Nick:
  Network Creation Games with Disconnected Equilibria. 394-401
  

Mechanism Design I

• Pinyan Lu, Changyuan Yu:
  Randomized Truthful Mechanisms for Scheduling Unrelated Machines. 402-413
  
• Birgit Heydenreich, Debasis Mishra, Rudolf Müller, Marc Uetz:
  Optimal Mechanisms for Single Machine Scheduling. 414-425
  
• Krzysztof R. Apt, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo, Evangelos Markakis:
  Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms. 426-437
  
• Sujit Gujar, Yadati Narahari:
  Redistribution of VCG Payments in Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects. 438-445
  
• Guosong Yu, Guochuan Zhang:
  Bin Packing of Selfish Items. 446-453
  

Network Games II

• Mao-cheng Cai, Qizhi Fang:
  Restricted Core Stability of Flow Games. 454-464
  
• Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot:
  Three Selfish Spanning Tree Games. 465-476
  
• Arash Asadpour, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Amin Saberi:
  Stochastic Submodular Maximization. 477-489
  
• Thomas Dueholm Hansen, Orestis Telelis:
  On Pure and (Approximate) Strong Equilibria of Facility Location Games. 490-497
  
• Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Gagan Goel, Vijay V. Vazirani, Lei Wang, Changyuan Yu:
  Efficiency, Fairness and Competitiveness in Nash Bargaining Games. 498-505
  

Equilibrium

• Wan Huang, Bernhard von Stengel:
  Computing an Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium in Polynomial Time. 506-513
  
• Joseph Naor, Danny Raz, Gabriel Scalosub:
  Homogeneous Interference Game in Wireless Networks. 514-521
  
• Kamalika Chaudhuri, Fan Chung Graham, Mohammad Shoaib Jamall:
  A Network Coloring Game. 522-530
  

Mechanism Design II

• Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira, Aviv Zohar:
  Asynchronous Best-Reply Dynamics. 531-538
  
• Ronen Gradwohl:
  Fault Tolerance in Distributed Mechanism Design. 539-547
  
• Tanmoy Chakraborty, Michael Kearns:
  Bargaining Solutions in a Social Network. 548-555
  

Online Advertisement

• Yiling Chen, Arpita Ghosh, Randolph Preston McAfee, David Pennock:
  Sharing Online Advertising Revenue with Consumers. 556-565
  
• Yunhong Zhou, Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Rajan M. Lukose:
  Budget Constrained Bidding in Keyword Auctions and Online Knapsack Problems. 566-576
  
• Eyal Even-Dar, Jon Feldman, Yishay Mansour, S. Muthukrishnan:
  Position Auctions with Bidder-Specific Minimum Prices. 577-584
  

Sponsored Search Auctions

• David Kempe, Mohammad Mahdian:
  A Cascade Model for Externalities in Sponsored Search. 585-596
  
• Rica Gonen, Sergei Vassilvitskii:
  Sponsored Search Auctions with Reserve Prices: Going Beyond Separability. 597-608
  
• Mahyar Salek, David Kempe:
  Auctions for Share-Averse Bidders. 609-620
  
• Gagan Aggarwal, Jon Feldman, S. Muthukrishnan, Martin Pál:
  Sponsored Search Auctions with Markovian Users. 621-628
  
• Ioannis Giotis, Anna R. Karlin:
  On the Equilibria and Efficiency of the GSP Mechanism in Keyword Auctions with Externalities. 629-638
  

Voting Problem

• Michael Kearns, Jinsong Tan:
  Biased Voting and the Democratic Primary Problem. 639-652
  
• Shahar Dobzinski, Ariel D. Procaccia:
  Frequent Manipulability of Elections: The Case of Two Voters. 653-664
  
• Florian Schoppmann:
  The Power of Small Coalitions in Cost Sharing. 665-674
  
• Itai Ashlagi, Piotr Krysta, Moshe Tennenholtz:
  Social Context Games. 675-683
  

Algorithms and Optimization II

• Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Thomas Dueholm Hansen, Peter Bro Miltersen, Troels Bjerre Sørensen:
  Approximability and Parameterized Complexity of Minmax Values. 684-695
  
• Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer, Kamal Jain:
  An "Ethical" Game-Theoretic Solution Concept for Two-Player Perfect-Information Games. 696-707
  
• Mohammad Mahdian, Randolph Preston McAfee, David Pennock:
  The Secretary Problem with a Hazard Rate Condition. 708-715
  
• Galina Schwartz, Nikhil Shetty, Jean C. Walrand:
  Impact of QoS on Internet User Welfare. 716-723
  
• Dawen Meng, Guoqiang Tian, Lei Sun:
  Nonlinear Pricing with Network Externalities. 724-731